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From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch:
Ten Years of Balancing Libel Law and
The First Amendment
By JAMES J. BROSNAHAN*
THE clash between society's interest in preserving the integrity of
an individual's reputation and the responsibility of the press to inform
on matters of public concern has produced a profound and continuing
national ambivalence regarding the accountability of the press. Histor-
ical expansion of the freedom of the press rested primarily on the
libertarian theory that an independent press was indispensable to free-
dom of political opinion and the concomitant right to criticize the
government.1 Given this theoretical foundation, constitutional protec-
tion for the press reaches its zenith where the press is performing its
function as critic of the state. Conversely, where the target of adverse
commentary is a private individual, the constitutionally protected status
of the press is most tenuous.
The problem is best illuminated by consideration of the fol-
lowing hypothetical. Three days before the filing deadline for candi-
dacy for public office, a newspaper receives information from a reliable
informant, whom it has used before, that a potential candidate has
taken a bribe. The paper does what it can in the time available to
confirm the accuracy of the report. Clearly the public should be ad-
vised of reliable information that a would-be candidate for office has
committed a serious offense relevant to his qualifications for office.
The information is published, and the candidate, under extreme public
pressure, withdraws from the race. The action taken by the newspaper
might well be considered laudatory; however, after the candidate has
suffered personal humiliation and unpairment of his earning potential,
it is determined to an: absolute certainty that the published reports were
* B.S.B.A., 1956, Boston College; LL.B., 1959, Harvard Umversity; Member,
Califorma Bar.
1. See L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF Tm PREss FROM ZENGER TO JEFERSON (1966).
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false. The dilemma here is clear: the public's right to know has col-
lided with the individual's right not to be damaged in his reputation
by the publication of defamatory falsehoods.
This article will trace the development of constitutional protection
of libelous and defamatory utterances beginning with the watershed
case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan2 through the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.3 Substantive and pro-
cedural developments since New York Times will be described, with
particular emphasis given to the distinctive constitutional approach
adopted by the majority of the Court in Gertz. The Gertz opinion
brings about three major developments which substantially depart from
the reasoning of the New York Times decision and its progeny: (1)
adoption of a constitutional balancing test which weighs the First
Amendment interest in the institutional autonomy of the media against
the state's interest in compensating an individual for wrongful injury
to his reputation; (2) reformulation of the "public figure" concept and
(3) significant alteration of the common law rules governing damages
in libel actions.
Pre-New York Times Law and Theory
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,4 a publisher printed materials susceptible of a defamatory
meaning at his peril. The American Law Institute's Restatement of
the Law of Torts, promulgated in 1938, listed truth5 and consent6 as
defenses to the publication of defamatory material; it also recognized
a very narrow conditional privilege. 7 Section 598 provided, under the
heading of a "public interest" defense, that:
[a]n occasion is conditionally privileged when the circumstances
induce a correct or reasonable belief that (a) facts exist which af-
fect a sufficiently important public interest, and (b) the public in-
terest requires the communication of the defamatory matter to a
public officer or private citizen and that such person is authorized
or privileged to act if the defamatory matter is true.8
The comments to that section made clear that the privilege applied only
when a substantial interest of the public, such as the prevention of
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. 94 S. Ct 2997 (1974).
4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 582 (1938).
6. Id. § 583.
7. Id. § 598.
8. Id.
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crime or the apprehension of criminals, was threatened. The com-
ments specifically stated that the rule "does not afford a privilege to
publish false defamatory statements of fact about public officers or can-
didates for office" 9 and "is not intended to constitute an all-inclusive
category of public interests which may be protected by the publication
of defamatory communications concerning others."10 As he so often
had done, Professor Prosser succinctly summarized the common law
doctrine of strict liability for the publication of false defamatory matter
when he said:
The effect of this strict liability [for defamatory publications] is
to place the printed, written or spoken word in the same class with
the use of explosives or the keeping of dangerous animals. If a
defamatory meaning, which is false, is reasonably understood, the
defendant publishes at his peril, and there is no possible defense
except the rather narrow one of privilege."
As the law of defamation developed a rule of strict liability, com-
mentators and judges developed various interpretations of the relation-
ship of the First Amendment to the law of defamation. Three inter-
pretations bear directly on the conflict between libel law and the First
Amendment. These are Justice Black's so-called "absolute" theory,
Professor Emerson's balancing theory, and Professor Meiklejohn's
theory of absolute privilege for statements pertaining to matters of
"governing importance."
In a number of the First Amendment cases, Justice Black enun-
ciated the view that the language of the First Amendment is to be given
literal effect. Under his interpretation the words "Congress shall make
no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. ... "I'
applied without qualification to Congress under the First Amendment
and to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. In Roth v.
United States,'8 Justice Black concurred in the dissent in which Justice
Douglas stated:
I reject too the implication that problems of freedom of speech and
of the press are to be resolved by weighing against the values of
free expression, the judgment of the Court that a particular form
of that expression has "no redeeming social importance." The
First Amendment, its prohibition in terms absolute, was designed
to preclude courts as well as legislatures from weighing the values
9. Id., comment a.
10. Id., comment b.
11. W. PROSSER, IAW OF TORTS 773 (4th ed. 1971).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
13. 354U.S. 476 (1957).
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of speech against silence. The First Amendment puts free speech
in the preferred position.
14
Justice Black's absolute theory was articulated in various contexts over
the years. 15 Indeed, he carried this interpretation into New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan in a concurring opinion which would have pro-
tected all speech irrespective of malice.' 6
Professor Emerson's view of the First Amendment was that "[t]he
Court must in each case balance the individual and social interest in
freedom of expression against the social interests sought by the regula-
tion which restricts expression.' 7  This balancing approach resembles
the methodology employed by the Court in resolving a variety of consti-
tutional issues.
The theory advanced by Professor Meiklejohn was derived from-
the principle of "self-government." If a defamatory statement related
to activities by which citizens govern the nation, it should, in his view,
be absolutely privileged. If a defamatory statement related to a purely
private matter, not having to do with government, it remained subject
to legislative control.' It is the Meiklejohn theory of absolute privilege
for questions of "governing importance" that most clearly resembles the
position taken by the majority in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
On March 29, 1960, the New York Times published a full page
advertisement describing certain events alleged to have occurred in
Montgomery, Alabama, including an account of alleged activities by po-
lice against black demonstrators. L.B. Sullivan, the elected Commis-
sioner of Public Affairs of Montgomery, responsible for supervising the
police department, brought a civil action for libel. The jury returned
a verdict in his favor and awarded damages in the amount of $500,000.
The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed. In the United States Su-
14. Id. at 514 (dissenting opinion).
15. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959) (concurring in the
reversal of a conviction for possession of obscene material). See also Brennan, The Su-
preme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARv. L.
Rav. 1, 4 (1965).
16. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (concurring opin-
ion).
17. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the Fust Amendment, 72 YALE LJ.
877 (1963).
18. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Cr. Ra,. 245;
see Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amend-
ment, 79 IHAv. L. REv. 1, 12-14 (1965).
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preme Court, all justices agreed, albeit for varying reasons, that the
judgment should be reversed.
The opinion of the Court, written by Justice Brennan and joined
by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Clark, Harlan, Stewart and White,
held that in a state libel trial, a public official must establish "malice,"
defined as knowing falsity or a reckless disregard for the truth, on the
part of the defendant publisher in order to recover money damages for
defamatory statements concerning his official conduct. 19 Justice Black,
joined by Justice Douglas, concurred on the ground that the First
Amendment would prevent money damages in libel suits involving pub-
lic officials, without regard to the application of a malice standard .2
Justice Douglas also joined a concurring opinion by Justice Goldberg
which argued for an unconditional privilege under the First Amend-
ment allowing citizens to criticize official conduct despite the harm
which may flow from excesses or abuses. 21
The majority opinion contained broad statements generally sup-
porting freedom of speech and the right to publish. Included in the
opinion was the observation of Judge Learned Hand that the First
Amendment "presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be
gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than -through any kind of au-
thoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we
have staked upon it our all."22  The Court specifically recognized the
danger of abuse, but recalled the counseling of Madison that "[s]ome
degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything; and
in no instance is this more true than in that of the press. 23  Having
acknowledged the possibility of abuse, the Court rested its decision
upon the need to relieve publishers from the threat of large damage
awards which would have an inhibiting and chilling effect upon the
publication of information relating to public officials.
A major premise of the Court's decision was that truth as a defense
does not provide adequate protection for the First Amendment rights
of the press.24 The Court cited the experience under the Sedition Act,
which allowed the defense of truth, and pointed out that the act was
19. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
20. Id. at 293-97 (concurring opinion).
21. Id. at 297-305 (concurring opinion).
22. Id. at 270, quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1943).
23. 376 U.S. at 271, quoting 4 S. ELLiOT, TEE DEBATES IN T:E SEvERAL STATE
CONVNTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 571 (1881).
24. 376 U.S. at 278.
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vigorously condemned as unconstitutional in an attack led by Jefferson
and Madison. The Court traced the historical debate concerning the
Sedition Act and concluded that history had proven the invalidity of that
law, noting that Congress by special act actually repaid fines levied
under it.25 Having concluded that the defense of truth was inadequate
to allow breathing room for constitutionally protected speech, the ma-
jority opinion embarked upon an independent examination of the
record in light of the newly announced malice requirement stated
above. 28 Application of this standard resulted in the determination that
the judgment in favor of Sullivan constituted a forbidden intrusion on
the field of free expression.
Justice Black, in his concurring opinion, asserted that the First
Amendment provides complete immunity: "An unconditional right to
say what one pleases about public affairs is what I consider to be the
minimum guarantee of the First Amendment."
28
The unanimity of opinion present in New York Times highlights
the solid ground supporting constitutional protection for statements con-
cerning the conduct of public officials. A literal reading of Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. 9 suggests that the consensus with regard to public
officials has survived to date. However, the unanimity of opinion ex-
pressed in New York Times gradually dissipated in the intervening
years, as lower courts, and eventually the Supreme Court, confronted
three major questions left unanswered by New York Times: (1) What
is the precise definition and scope of application of the "malice" stand-
ard? (2) What procedural safeguards should accompany the constitu-
tional "malice" standard? (3) Who or what comprises the classes of
persons or events about which statements can be made with immunity
under the First Amendment?
The Progeny of New York Times
The Definition of "Malice"
In New York Times the Supreme Court required a plaintiff who
was a public official to establish that a defamatory statement was made
with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard of its truth.3" Al-
25. Id. at 273, 276.
26. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
27. 376 U.S. at 283-92.
28. Id. at 297.
29. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974).
30. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
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though "reckless disregard" sounds at first much like a standard of
"gross negligence," it has been definitively interpreted to require a
"conscious awareness of probable falsity. ' 31 In St. Amant v. Thomp-
son,3 2 with only Justice Fortas dissenting, the Court found the award
of damages faulty because nothing in the record indicated an awareness
by the defendant of the probable falsity of the statement. Having an-
nounced the principle that the failure to investigate does not in itself
establish the requisite state of mind, the Court concluded that other ac-
tions by the defendant, which were claimed to show that he was "heed-
less," did not amount to positive proof that he possessed conscious
awareness of probable falsity. 3 This, of course, is a heavy burden for
a plaintiff to meet inasmuch as affirmative evidence of a knowing state
of mind must be produced. In a footnote in the Gertz decision, the
majority touched briefly upon the definition of reckless disregard in an
uncritical recitation of prior cases, including St. Amant v. Thompson;
34
thus, it appears that at least five members of the present Court would
adhere to the "reckless disregard" standard announced in St. Amant.
Additional Procedural Safeguards
Although rejecting Justice Black's literal interpretation of the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court over the years has nonetheless sought,
in various ways, to fashion a set of protective rules that will discourage
the bringing of libel actions where the alleged defamatory statements
relate to matters in the public arena. It has correspondingly sought to
encourage that degree of editorial confidence which is a precondition
to a decision to publish. One result of these efforts has been the re-
placement of the "preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof
by a standard which requires the plaintiff to prove the elements of a
libel action involving "public officials" and "public figures" by clear and
convincing evidence.35 It is unclear whether juries are able or willing
to be guided by the courts' instructions on standard of proof, but the
clear and convincing standard undoubtedly offers additional tactical ad-
vantages to the defendant.36
31. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
32. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
33. Id. at 733.
34. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2997, 3004-05 n.6 (1974).
35. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 30 (1971).
36. See generally on the standard of proof Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279
(1971); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); Beckley Newspapers Corp.
v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 83 (1967); Waskow v. Associated Press, 462 F.2d 1173, 1175
(D.C. Cir, 1972); Firestone v, Time, Inc., 460 F.2d 712, 718 (5th Cir. 1972); Time,
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The imposition of the clear and convincing evidence standard is
a good example of the judicial procedural tinkering necessary once Jus-
tice Black's interpretation of the First Amendment is rejected. In addi-
tion, a number of courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead in
making independent findings of fact on motions for summary judgment
to determine the existence of malice in cases where constitutional con-
siderations so require. Appellate courts have also required a de novo
review to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a find-
ing of malice.1
8
Classes of Persons and Events Within the Realm of Constitutionally
Protected Discussion and Debate
The galvanizing force which brought unanimity to the Supreme
Court in New York Times was the fact that Mr. Sullivan was clearly
a public official. He had direct governmental responsibility for the
Montgomery police force and had voluntarily assumed a position which
was the legitimate subject of substantial public debate. Two years after
New York Times, in Rosenblatt v. Baer,39 the Court suggested the min-
imal perimeters of the "public official" classification. The plaintiff in
Rosenblatt was a former employee of a county, having served in the
capacity of supervisor of the county's recreation area. The Court said:
It is clear, therefore, that the "public official" designation applies
at the very least to -those among the hierarchy of government em-
ployees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial re-
sponsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental af-
fairs.
40
Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565, 572 (5th Cir. 1969); United Medical Laboratories, Inc.
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 404 F.2d 706, 712 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 921 (1969); Sellers v. Time, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 582, 584 (E.D. Pa. 1969),
aff'd, 423 F.2d 887 (3rd Cir. 1970); Belli v. Curtis Publ. Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 384,
388, 102 Cal. Rptr. 122, 124 (1972).
37. See Mistrot v. True Detective Pubi. Corp., 467 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1972); Mil-
ler v. News Syndicate Co., 445 F.2d 356 (2nd Cir. 1971); LaBruzzo v. Associated Press,
353 F. Supp. 979 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Thuma v. Hearst Corp., 340 F. Supp. 867 (D. Md.
1972); McFarland v. Hearst Corp., 332 F. Supp. 746 (D. Md. 1971); Alexander v. Lan-
caster, 330 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. La. 1971); Belli v. Curtis Pub]. Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d
384, 102 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1972). See generally Comment, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1547, 1565
n.116 (1972). One reason so many libel cases have ended with the granting of a sum-
mary judgment for the defendant is that the plaintiff's burden to produce some evidence
that the publisher or his agents knew of the falsity of the writing or had a high degree
of awareness of its probable falsity is difficult and in many cases impossible to meet.
38. See Greenbelt Co-op Publ. Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 11 (1970); Firestone
v. Time, Inc., 460 F.2d 712, 718 (5th Cir. 1972); Belli v. Curtis Publ. Co., 25 Cal.
App. 3d 384, 389, 102 Cal. Rptr. 122, 125 (1972).
39. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
40. Id. at 85.
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The Court's own difficulties with the uncertainties of that definition
were manifested by its action in remanding the case for trial.41
In Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 42 the Court addressed the question
of what matters relating to the official conduct of a public official are
of such significance as to bring public discourse thereof within constitu-
tional safeguards. In an opinion by Justice Stewart, the Court held that
protection applied to discussion of matters pertaining to any alleged
conduct which touched upon a candidate's or official's fitness for office.
Having resolved that "relevance" was to be interpreted broadly, the
Court held "as a matter of constitutional law that a charge of criminal
conduct, no matter how remote in time or place, can never be irrelevant
to an official's or a candidate's fitness for office . . . ,,43 However,
the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that incidental service on gov-
ernmental committees or other minor governmental activities does not
warrant "public official" desination where the defamatory statement
is totally unrelated to such minor involvement.44
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,45 a unanimous Court expanded
the class of plaintiffs subject to First Amendment scrutiny to include
public figures. Despite the unanimity on the basic constitutional ques-
tion, two distinct definitions of "public figures" appeared in the opin-
ions of the Court. The concept in the opinion by Justice Harlan, joined
in by Justices Clark, Fortas and Stewart, may be summarized as follows:
a public figure-plaintiff is one who because of status or conduct is the
voluntary subject of continuing and substantial public interest inde-
pendent of the publication at issue, and who therefore has access to
the means of counterargument sufficient to rebut the defamatory false-
hood directed at him." The definition by Chief Justice Warren, con-
curred in by the four remaining members of the Court, included not
only persons who "by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of
concern to society at large" but also those who are "intimately involved
in the resolution of important public questions. . .. ,,47 Under Chief
Justice Warren's view, the most important factor was involvement in
41. On the subject of who is a public official, see generally Eadie v. Pole, 91 N.J.
Super. 504, 221 A.2d 547 (App. Div. 1966); Arnot., Libel and Slander: Who Is a Pub-
lic Official?, 19 A.L.R.3d 1361 (1968).
42. 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
43. Id. at 277. See also Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971);
Comment, 70 MICH. L. Rnv. 1547, 1551-53 (1972),
44. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2997, 3012 (1974).
45. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
46. Id. at 154-55.
47. Id. at 164.
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public issues or events for he assumed that such involvement itself guar-
anteed access for the purpose of controverting defamatory criticism.48
Consistent with Chief Justice Warren's emphasis on "involvement
in public issues," subsequent decisions in the federal courts continued
to expand the scope of the New York Times privilege. For example,
in Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines and Broadcasting, Inc.,49 the Ninth Cir-
cuit defined "public figures" as follows:
"Public figures" are those persons who, though not public officials,
are "involved in issues in which the public has a justified and im-
portant interest." Such figures are, of course, numerous and in-
clude artists, athletes, business people, dilettantes, anyone who is
famous or infamous because of who he is or what he has done.50
Other courts went beyond the status of the plaintiff and applied the
New York Times rule on the independent ground that the subject of
the allegedly defamatory publication was a matter of public interest. 1
When the Supreme Court eventually confronted the question of
whether to extend New York Times coverage to parties other than pub-
lic officials or public figures, no more than three justices could agree
on any single standard of protection.
In an opinion by Justice Brennan, joined only by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court, in Rosenbloon v.
Metromedia, Inc.,52 held that the New York Times privilege applied
to defamatory statements regarding a private individual's involvement
in a matter of public or general concern. Justice Black, in a one para-
graph concurring opinion, reasserted his absolutist view of the First
Amendment. 3 Justice Douglas did not participate in the decision.
While only three justices supported the adoption of the N,,ew York
Times rule, all eight participating justices approved of some form of
constitutional protection for publications concerning matters of public
interest, despite the fact of injury to the reputation of persons without
prior notoriety. There the matter rested until the Court's decision in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 4 in June 1974.
48. Id.
49. 392 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1968).
50. Id. at 419.
51. E.g., Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970); Wasser-
man v. Time, Inc., 424 F.2d 920, 922 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 940 (1970);
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1969).
52. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
53. Id. at 57.
54. 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974).
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Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
The plaintiff in Gertz was an attorney in a civil action involving
the family of a youth who had been shot and killed by a police officer.
The shooting incident had also resulted in the criminal conviction of
the officer for second degree murder. The plaintiff neither partici-
pated in the criminal proceeding nor discussed the officer with mem-
bers of the press; nevertheless, the defendant-publisher released an ar-
ticle characterizing the plaintiff as the "architect" of the prosecution
which was part of a nationwide Communist conspiracy to discredit local
law enforcement agencies. The article contained false accusations with
respect both to the plaintiff's membership in Communist-front organiza-
tions and to his criminal record. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit ap-
plied the New York Times privilege to sustain a judgment for the de-
fendant on the ground that the defamatory statements concerned an is-
sue of significant public interest.55
The Supreme Court, with a majority of five, held that the consti-
tutional privilege established in New York Times does not extend to
defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public of-
ficial nor a public figure. Rather than expanding the New York Times
privilege to defamatory statements made in connection with the report-
ing of an event of public interest, the Court imposed a number of re-
strictions on the law of libel designed to accommodate freedom of the
press with the state's interest in protecting a private individual's reputa-
tion. Specifically, the Court held that (1) the state may not impose
liability without fault, but within that limitation may define any other
standards of media liability where the defamatory statement concerns
a private individual56 and (2) in cases where liability is not based upon
a showing of knowing or reckless falsity, the state may only permit re-
covery of actual damages-recovery of either presumed or punitive
damages was proscribed.57  Having determined that the plaintiff was
neither a public official nor a public figure,18 the Court reversed and
remanded for a new trial.
The imposition of limits on the law of libel involves a substantial
departure from the New York Times approach in -that the focus of the
Court switched from the demands of the First Amendment to the legiti-
mate state interest in the law of defamation. While asserting that
55. 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972).
56. 94 S. Ct. at 3010.
57. Id.at3011.
58. Id. at 3012-13.
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"there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact,"5 9 the Court
nevertheless recognized their inevitability in free debate and reaf-
firmed the need to insulate the media from the danger of self-censor-
ship. But "[tihe need to avoid self-censorship by the news media is
. . . not the only societal value at issue,"6 and the Court's refusal to
extend New York Times immunity to private persons was based on re-
spect for the purposes served by state libel law. Indeed, the Court
stated that the holdings in New York Times and subsequent cases were
not justified solely by reference to the interest of the media; rather,
"the New York Times rule states an accomodation between this con-
cern and the limited state interest present in the context of libel actions
brought by public persons."'" Since, in the view of the Court, the rela-
tive positions of the public and the private person differ, a different
rule should obtain with regard to the state's ability to compensate the
private individual for injury to his reputation.
The Court's focus on the status of the plaintiff rather than on the
subject matter of the publication constituted a rejection of the rationale
of the plurality in Rosenbloom. In the view of the majority, the ap-
proach of the Rosenbloom plurality did not afford sufficient recognition
to the legitimate state interest in enforcing a remedy for wrongful injury
to a private person's reputation. The majority also found the plurality
approach unacceptable because it imposed on courts the task of decid-
ing on an ad hoc basis what issues were of "general or public inter-
est"-a task which the majority felt should not be committed to "the
conscience of judges." '62
Accommodation of the competing values of the First Amendment
and the states' legitimate interest in libel laws took the form of a "con-
stitutionalized" reform of the law of libel. Recognizing the danger of
self-censorship which accompanies imposition of liability without fault,
59. Id. at 3007.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 3008-09 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 3010. The question of what constituted a matter of public interest pre-
sented some difficulty. See, e.g., Treutler v. Meredith Corp., 455 F.2d 255, 259 (8th
Cir. 1972); Gospel Spreading Church v. Johnson Publ. Co., 454 F.2d 1050, 1051 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858, 862 (5th Cir. 1970);
United Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 404 F.2d 706,
710-11 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921 (1969). However, in practice, the
editorial decision to publish carried great weight and appellate courts were very reluctant
to find that the subject was not a "matter of public interest." See Comment, 70 MICH. L
Rnv. 1547, 1560-61 n.94 (1972), which cites a great number of cases but lists very few
holdings that the defamatory statement in question was not related to a matter of public
interest.
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the Court concluded that strict liability was incompatible with First
Amendment guarantees. With that caveat, the Court left the states
free to impose any other standard of care except in cases where the
presence of a public official or public figure called for the application
of the New York Times standard. Again balancing First Amendment
considerations, the Court concluded that the state's legitimate interest
extended no further than compensation for actual injury63 and held that
juries could not award either damages for "presumed" injuries or puta-
tive damages. The Court reasoned that allowing awards of presumed
and punitive damages vested in juries an uncontrolled discretion en-
abling them to punish unpopular opinion and thus exacerbated the dan-
ger of media se-censorship.
While the Gertz holding involves a substantial departure from the
approach and rationale of the Rosenbloom plurality, the decision actu-
ally has its roots in the dissents of that case. The Gertz majority
adopted the solution proposed by Justice Marshall in his dissent in
Rosenbloom,6" and much of the justification for the rules is found is
Justice Harlan's Rosenbloom dissent.65 Indeed, the unusual concurring
opinion filed by Justice Blackmun66 sets -the Gertz decision in -context
and illustrates the chronic uncertainties that have arisen since. New
York Times. Justice Blackmun acknowledged that he had joined the
plurality in Rosenbloom because he saw it as the logical development
of the New York Times doctrine and that he still adhered to that view
However he stated that, because the Gertz approach leaves "sufficient
and adequate breathing space for a vigorous press" and because it was
"of profound importance for the Court to come to rest in the defamation
area," he chose to join the opinion in order to produce what he felt
to be a definitive ruling.17 Thus, while he viewed Gertz as somewhat
illogical in view of New York Times, he considered the effect 'f the
decision to be the same.
Impact of Gertz on the New York Times Doctrine
Since the defamatory allegation in Gertz involved a matter of con-
siderable public concern-the existence of a national conspiracy to dis-
credit the police-the majority opinion in Gertz represents a' significant
63. 94 S. Ct. at 3011.
64. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 78 (1971) (Marshall, 3., dis-
senting).
65. Id. at 62 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
66. 94 S. Ct. at 3013-14.
67. Id.
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retreat from the New York Times commitment to free and open debate
on public issues.68 In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger ar-
gued that the orderly case development following New York Times
should be preserved and that the "doctrinal theory" applied by the
Gertz majority had "no jurisprudential ancestry.""9 It is clear that the
Gertz majority adopted neither Justice Black's unqualified view of the
scope of First Amendment protection nor the ad hoc balancing ap-
proach espoused by Professor Emerson.7" In order to define the dis-
tinction between the constitutional perspectives underlying the majority
opinions in Gertz and the New York Times line of cases, it is first nec-
essary to examine the First Amendment grounds for the rule an-
nounced in the New York Times decision.
The fundamental premise supporting the New York Times rule
is that the freedom of expression upon public questions is a primary
right of self-government secured by the First Amendment.7 Chief
Justice Warren, in a concurring opinion in Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 72 noted that "the New York Times standard is an important safe-
guard for the rights of the press and public to inform and be informed
on matters of legitimate interest." 3  In the majority opinion in Time,
Inc. v. Hill74 and in the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc.,"t both written by Justice Brennan, the New York Times privilege
was extended on the basis that the publications under litigation involved
matters of public concern.76 Indeed in Rosenbloom, the plurality opin-
ion announced "that the determinant [of] whether the First Amend-
ment applies to state libel actions is whether the utterance involved con-
cerns an issue of public or general concern .... ,,77
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Gertz,75 restated the principles that
68. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
69. 94 S. Ct. at 3014 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
70. The majority opinion expressly rejected the balancing theory on the grounds
that it would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expectations, since it would re-
quire careful examiniation of each libel verdict. Id. at 3009.
71. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964); New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-71 (1964). See also Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and
the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 581, 590-91
(1964).
72. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
73. Id. at 164-65.
74. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
75. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
76. 403 U.S. at 40-45; 385 U.S. at 388.
77. 403 U.S. at 44.
78. 94 S. Ct. at 3017.
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follow from the view that "ventilation of public issues" is the constitu-
tional justification for the New York Times privilege. First, insofar as
the paramount public interest relates -to the "content, effect and signifi-
cance" of the event or conduct reported, neither the prior anonymity
of the plaintiff-participant nor the involuntary nature of his involvement
in the event is relevant to the basic First Amendment interest promoted
by New York Times immunity.79 Second, judicial reliance on the dis-
tinction between private and public parties encourages intrusion into
the private aspects of the lives of public figures and discourages discus-
sion of issues of general concern involving persons without prior public
exposure. s0 Justice Brennan concluded that in light of the constitu-
tional objective of the New York Times rule, the private status of a
plaintiff could not justify the failure to apply that rule.
The majority in Gertz rejected the "public or general interest" test
on the grounds that determining what issues are of general concern is
not a proper judicial function and that the amorphous concept of public
interest issues does not adequately accommodate the competing inter-
ests of publishers and private individuals.81 While the majority's rea-
soning rests in part on specific considerations supporting a higher level
of protection for "private individuals," '82 the Courfs abandonment of
"public issues" as a judicial criterion of the New York Times privilege
may be construed as a repudiation of the justification for First Amend-
ment limitations on state libel law articulated in New York Times and
its progeny. This development calls into question the nature of the
First Amendment interest relied upon by the majority in formulating
the novel rules announced in Gertz. Analysis of the scope of the ma-
jority holding offers at least a tentative answer.
The majority opinion did not set out the precise scope of its hold-
ing, and this omission leaves the decision subject to different interpre-
tations of the extent of its reach. First, since the fact situation is similar
in many ways to that of Rosenbloom and the rationale of that case is
reexamined, the decision may be viewed as limited in application to
instances in which the defamatory statement concerns a private individ-
ual involved in an event of general or public interest. As noted,8 8 how-
ever, the Court expressly rejected the Rosenbloom plurality approach
in part because it felt that the courts should abstain from determining
79. Id. at 3018.
80. ld. at 3019.
81. Id. at 3010.
82. See text accompanying note 97 infra.
8$. See tt 4ccompanying notes 81 supra,
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what matters are of general or public interest. Thus, insofar as this
limited interpretation is inconsistent with the majority's reasoning, the
rules expounded in Gertz would seem to apply to all defamatory state-
ments about private individuals irrespective of the subject matter of the
publication.
A second possible reading is that the Court's new rules govern def-
amation actions against private parties as well as "the media." Justice
White, in his dissent, assumed that the libel law limitations in the ma-
jority opinion apply in "each and every defamation action. '8 4 In a com-
prehensive analysis of the sweeping changes in common law libel ef-
fected by the majority, Justice White was strongly critical of the Court's
lack of respect for the history and values supporting state libel laws.
His principal criticism was that by abrogating settled principles of libel
law, the Court improvidently shifted the risk of a defamatory falsehood
from the publisher to the innocent private individual. This conclusion
was based on the observation that the majority opinion not only limited
the amount of damages which a private individual may obtain but also
deprived him of a judicial declaration that the statement was false
where negligence is not established."
A careful reading of the majority and dissenting opinions, how-
ever, would suggest a somewhat narrower scope. The majority initially
framed the issue as whether a "newspaper or broadcaster" may claim
the New York Times privilege for defamatory statements about a pri-
vate individual.8 6 The opinion thereafter repeatedly referred to "pub-
lisher or broadcaster,"8' 7 the "press and broadcast media,"' s8 the "com-
munications media"8' 9 and the "media."90  The exact wording of the
holding is that, with the exception of liability without fault, "the States
may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a
publisher or broadcaster of [a] defamatory falsehood injurious to a pri-
vate individual." 91 Justice Blackmun read the majority opinion as ap-
plicable to "a media's liability,"9" Chief Justice Burger's dissent was cast
in terms of the "news media,"9" and Justice Brennan's dissent centered
84. 94 S. Ct. at 3022 (White, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 3031-35.
86. Id. at 3003.
87. Id. at 3007, 3010.
88. Id. at 3008, 3011.
89. Id. at 3008, 3010.
90. Id. at 3007.
91. Id. at 3010 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 3014 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
93. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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on "media reports." 4
The language employed seems to indicate that the Court's new
rules apply only when a media institution is the defendant. This inter-
pretation finds strong support in the rationale in Gertz for curtailing
state control in the libel field. The Court noted that the responsibility
for informing the public on a daily basis lies with the press, and that
"[ojur notions of liberty require a free and vigorous press that presents
what it believes to be information of interest or importance ....
The threat posed by libel law is that of self-censorship which would
impair the very functioning 6f a self-governing society which depends
upon free dissemination of information. Thus, the press, more than
any other institution, must be insulated from restraints which might in-
duce self-censorship. The limitation of the holding to the institution
of the press is also supported by- the distinction, drawn by the Gertz
Court, that public officials and public figures enjoy greater access to
the media than private individuals.
Thus, the constitutional principle that emerges from Gertz appears
to be founded upon recognition of the unique status of the institution
of the press in American society. Focus on the institution of the
media-rather than its operation in a specific context-best explains
the Court's paradoxical observation that the New York Times privilege
provides both too little and too much protection for the press. Too little
protection is provided because, although a stricter standard of liability
governs, application of the standard is conditioned upon discussion of
a matter of general or public interest. In rejecting the Rosenbloom
plurality view, the Court asserts that courts should not second guess the
press as to what is of relevance to the public. If protection is to be
afforded, it must apply to the full panoply of the media's operations.
However, the state's interest in providing a remedy for wrongful injury
to a private person's reputation requires that this protection not be abso-
lute, nor as stringent as New York Times would have it. Thus, the
Court concluded that the proper constitutional balance could be
achieved by removing the spectre of strict liability and large damage
awards thereby eliminating the threat of self-censorship without endan-
gering the institutional autonomy of the press.
The second major doctrinal development in Gertz is the reformu-
lation of the scope of the "public figure" concept originally defined by
94. Id. at 3018 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 82 (1971) (Marshall, I., dis-
senting).
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Justice Harlan in Curtis.6 In distinguishing public from private plain-
tiffs, the Court in Gertz reasoned that public officials and public figures
usually enjoy significantly greater opportunity to counteract false state-
ments than do their private counterparts and that the class of public
figures is comprised almost exclusively of persons who voluntarily as-
sume positions of prominence.9 7  The Court did not reject the theoreti-
cal possibility of an involuntary public figure, but it did conclude that
the media were entitled to assume that public figures have voluntarily
incurred the risk of closer public scrutiny. 8 Thus, under the reasoning
of the majority, "voluntary notoriety" and "access to the media" consti-
tute basic criteria of the public figure status.
The Court, however, departed from Justice Harlan's definition by
shifting the focus of the public figure question to "the nature and ex-
tent of an individual's participation in the particular controversy giving
rise to the defamation."99  It should be noted that the effect of this
change is to enlarge the public figure concept delineated by Justice
Harlan, since the latter was confined to plaintiffs who become the sub-
jects of public interest by virtue of events independent of those giving
rise to the defamatory publication. 100 Notwithstanding this apparent
shift toward a more expansive view of 'the "public figure," Justice
Brennan, quoting at length from his opinion in Rosenbloom, challenged
the majority's definition on the ground that the factors relied on were
irrelevant to the constitutional interest in comprehensive coverage of
newsworthy events.'' Justice Brennan's criticism is particularly signif-
icant given the majority's reliance on voluntary notoreity as a criterion
of the public figure, since those who deliberately seek anonymity are
excluded from this category regardless of the level of public interest
in their activity. The potential chilling effect of removing New York
Times protection from investigative reporting of clandestine activities
is a factor supporting Justice Brennan's views. Further, the majority's
distinction between public and private plaintiffs, unlike the dichotomy
between public and private issues, is one not easily made by editors
and broadcasters and may therefore increase the threat of self-censor-
ship.
96. 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967). See text accompanying note 46 supra.
97. 94 S. Ct. at 3009.
98. Id. at 3009-10.
99. Id. Justice Harlan, on the other hand, contended that public figure status was
conditioned on notoriety which arose from events or conduct which were not the subjects
of the defendant's publication. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
100. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
101. id. at 3018-19 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The -third major deviation from the New York Times approach lies
in the majority's promulgation of rules on damages. In the language
of the Court, "the States may not permit recovery of presumed or puni-
tive damages . . . when liability is not based on a showing of knowl-
edge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth."'1 2  Literally inter-
preted, this language would permit recovery of presumed and punitive
damages where a state conditions media liability for defamation of a
private individual on a showing of knowing falsity or reckless disregard.
Under this literal interpretation, the damages rules raise two questions.
The first is how much latitude a state has to permit the plaintiff
-to take maximum advantage of the Gertz rules. For example, could
a state establish two standards of liability-one "negligence," allowing
recovery only of actual proven damages, the other "knowing falsity or
reckless disregard," permitting presumed and punitive damages? The
second question is whether the Gertz limitations on damages will be
extended to cases in which the New York Times standard of liability
controls. While the knowing falsity or reckless disregard test implies
a significant degree of fault on the part of the media publisher, the
Court's primary justification for restricting damages awards when the
state is left free to define the standard of liability is that the "state inter-
est extends no further than compensation for actual injury."'' 0  It is
difficult to understand how the state's legitimate interest would differ
when a public official or public figure is -the target of a defamatory
statement, particularly considering the majority's judgment that such
plaintiffs 'have "voluntarily" subjected themselves to this risk and have
better opportunity to vindicate their reputations. 04 Given the compet-
ing First Amendment considerations, an equally strong argument exists
for limiting damages under the knowing falsity or reckless disregard
standard, at least where a public official or public figure is involved.
And the tone of the Court's discussion of the damages limitations leaves
the impression that the Court will be receptive to the argument when
the question arises.' 0 5
102. Id. at 3011.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 3009-10.
105. The American Law Institute is presently considering five alternatives to
money damages for incorporation in Restatement (Second) of Torts. REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) oF TORTS, Special Note at 295-98 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974). Tentative
Draft No. 20 lists these alternatives as follows:
(1) Declaratory relief, in the form of a declaratory judgment that the particular defam-
atory statement is false.
(2) Retraction, providing for the reduction of the publisher's liability upon compliance
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Conclusion
The profound ambivalence that produced the proliferation of con-
flicting judicial views after New York Times is reflected in the Supreme
Court's recent attempt to reconcile the demands of First Amendment
freedom of the press with the law of libel. In Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. the Court brought to a halt the extension of the New York Times
privilege by refusing to apply the knowing falsity or reckless disregard
standard to defamatory falsehoods concerning individuals who are
neither public officials nor public figures. Rather than focusing pri-
marily on the media's interest in unfettered airing of matters of public
concern, the Court squarely balanced the state's legitimate interest in
redressing injury to a private individual's reputation against the need
to avoid self-censorship on the part of the media.
Gertz involves a substantial departure from the broad, issue-
oriented, protective approach of the Warren Court in New York Times.
The constitutional principle which emerges from Gertz is that the so-
cietal role of the press-as an independant institution-requires that
it enjoy some measure of immunity from punishment for error in the
full scope of its operation. The Court therefore eliminated any distinc-
tion between matters worthy of public attention and those that are not.
Instead, the Court solidified the distinction between "public" and "pri-
vate" persons-not because the media interest was less demanding, but
because the state interest in protecting the private individual was more
compelling. Whether the resulting rules will afford more or less pro-
tection is largely a matter of speculation, but there seems little question
that the Court has retreated from the idea that the First Amendment
rights of the press occupy a preferred position in the law of libel.
with a request for retraction after receiving notification of the falsity of the defamatory
statement. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 48a (West 1954).
(3) Injunctive relief. Despite the difficulties attending prior restraint, the draft suggests
that intervention to prevent further publication of a statement might be proper once a
court has formally determined that the statement is defamatory.
(4) Right of reply. This alternative would require an offending newspaper to furnish
the defamed person a suitable opportunity to publish a reply in its columns. Further
consideration is moot, however, for the Supreme Court in Miami Herald Publ. Co. v.
Tornillo, 94 S. Ct. 2831 (1974), held such a statute unconstitutional as a violation of
freedom of the press.
(5) Self-help. Consideration of this alternative in a civilized society seems unnecessary.
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